Rotating the troops home from HERRICK

There was a lot of coverage of the MOD announcement on Tuesday 14 May that the UK would be changing its deployment routine for the final phase of Operation HERRICK (UK ops in Afghanistan). Since the operation began, rotations of the major formations have happened on a roughly six monthly basis, with units relieving each other in country. Originally, when set against the planned timeline for withdrawal, a further three HERRICK rotations were due to occur. Under yesterdays announcement the MOD has now changed its plans slightly, with the three rotations replaced by two longer deployments. In effect each of the last two HERRICKS will be eight months long instead of six.

 

The news has been met in some quarters with allegations that the Army is too overstretched and that this announcement is a direct result of defence cuts and not other reasons. Frankly these thoughts stand up to little scrutiny. When one looks into the timetable for the next two years, it is clear that the one of the rotations was scheduled to occur during the Afghan Elections in April, a period of time which would prove challenging, and place a major burden on the Afghan Security Forces. Delaying the relief by a few weeks will ensure that UK forces are not in the process of a handover during what could be a tense time. By delaying this rotation, the follow on force, which would have relieved the formation in October, would have arrived in late December – early January – at a point in time where it would have had barely eight weeks in theatre prior to the final withdrawal of UK troops. From a common sense perspective, it seems far more sensible to extend the tours of the formations out slightly, even if this does come as an annoyance to those deployed.

 

Longer tours are nothing new – for some time now many staff officers have been deploying on nine-twelve month continuity tours in particularly key posts. This makes for a long tour, but is manageable – yesterday’s announcement though marks the first time full formations will deploy for longer.

 

Part of the problem in getting a coherent debate on what the announcement really means is that to the public the phrase Afghanistan conjures up images of troops fighting for their lives in FOBS or the Green Zone. A steady stream of publicity about the incredible bravery of troops based in Helmand has led to many in the public assuming everyone will be extending and risking their lives in similar conditions for longer. The reality is a lot different as most troops by then will be working in Kandahar and Bastion enjoying a significantly different way of life to what many in the public assume goes on in HERRICK – the text below was taken from an email written by Humphrey during his time on HERRICK as a Staff Officer working at a major NATO HQ:

 

“Posters have gone up around the camp advertising the fact that on Friday nights there will be a weekly class in Greek Folk Dancing (surely we don’t have enough plates spare to smash though?), and at the same time, the gym has now issued a set of rules setting out when ‘registered couples’ are entitled to use the steam room & sauna in our gymnasium. Personally I don’t know what’s worse, the fact that we have a steam room & sauna at a time when young British troops are living in forward bases in Helmand, under constant attack, while using plastic bags to crap in, and eating cold rations (all the time under a 30% likelihood per tour that they will lose multiple limbs or be killed to an IED), or the fact that our NATO bureaucracy decided we needed rules to regulate when said steam room & sauna could or could not be used.

In a similar vein, we’ve just had the water fountain reconnected in our lovely gardens (the ones with the giant coliseum which can be seen from space). In a country with massive water shortages… we’ve spent taxpayers money ensuring that the fountain trickles nicely while we drink a cup of coffee at lunchtime. Meanwhile, if you walk down the road to the neighbouring US base, you will walk past a communal water pump at which you’ll see young children drinking from a communal cup. The locals, here in Afghanistan’s capital, don’t have a pumped water supply, and have to share from a central pump. We in the HQ (all of 200m away) have so much water to spare that we can use it in our garden fountains...

From our perspective we are seeking to withdraw, and in doing so are surging troops into the country in an effort to secure final ‘victory’ (whatever that phrase means in this context). The problem is that for us, we’re not seeing thousands of combat troops, replete with helicopters and rifles and cool things that make big explosions turning up and swarming into the badlands to close with, and kill, the enemy. Instead we’re seeing a surge of staff officers, often very senior ones, who are told ‘you’re deploying to Kabul’, and on arrival at the HQ are told to find themselves a job. We have the situation of people turning up here with no job, no roles and told to sit in an organisation and make themselves useful. As with all bureaucracies, when given this chance, rather than streamline the HQ, they are just adding themselves into the process chain. This means that things now take twice as long to do as before as people are insisting on being involved in things, which they have no knowledge of, or remit to do – they just want to be more involved in the HQ.

Other reminders that the HQ is in a strange place is the fact that we had an Earthquake the other night. We were about 150 miles from the epicentre (6.4 on the Richter scale), but the building still shook like crazy. To add insult to injury the locals decided that it would be great fun to fire a few rockets in our direction that night as well. Naturally the only greeting one could use the next day was ‘did the earth move for you too last night darling?’

Humphrey thought about the merits of posting the above (edited) email, but felt on balance that as it has been widely shared with friends, on ARRSE and also within a wider discussion provided to the Imperial War Museum as part of their Afghan recollections project, it was appropriate to provide it as an already public document, but it must be read in the context that not all HERRICK experiences are those seen on the TV – it should be seen very much as a cry of frustration by a very tired Officer during a difficult period , but also to understand the challenges of working in a complex operation. One should not read the frustrations of an email sent home to friends during this time as being any implicit criticism of policy by HM Govt or NATO as a whole, more as a sense of ‘letting off steam’ in the same way as we all do from time to time.

But, moving on from this, the points made above highlight that as we move towards transition, and away from combat operations, this sort of experience will be increasingly the norm for UK forces. Their roles will be far more about providing distant support and training to the Afghan Security Forces, or to assist with the preparation for withdrawal, which is a major logistical feat by itself. So, while it is inevitably frustrating for those troops who are deployed to find they will be away for longer, we do need to keep a sense of balance about what they will be doing, and the relative level of risk compared to earlier HERRICKS.

 

 

 Are Defence cuts  to blame?

The question is though, do these changes mean that defence cuts have bitten too deeply? It is hard to say yes that this is the case. Although the Army is shrinking by some 18,000, this final figure will still not be reached for many years. There is still plenty of manpower in the system to find and support this scale of deployment, and a key part of the SDSR and Future Force work was about ensuring that the UK could continue to deploy formations of up to around 7500 – 8000 personnel on an enduring basis. While an Army of 82,000 will inevitably find it harder to generate bodies than an army of 100,000, we should not for one moment assume that the UK is going to be unable to do a HERRICK in future on purely manpower grounds alone. One suspects though that over the next few years, all the decisions linked to manpower, ranging from rotations of units on OP HERRICK through to whether or not there are certain units or squadrons in flypasts or ceremonial functions as being linked to defence cuts.
 

It would also be wise to be wary of making too much of a song and dance about this extension as it may not sit well with the soldiers of allied nations. For a significant period of the US deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, US troops were deploying on 12-15 month rotations, with only two weeks off during this period. The author knows of cases where units flying home after 12 month tours were turned around in the air and returned to theatre with a six month extension in order to meet emergency surge requirements. By contrast the UK tour of eight months will be barely half that of most US troops tours in previous years, and all affected personnel have been given 12-18 months notice that its going to happen to them. While it is doubtless annoying, and frustrating for the troops and their families, we perhaps need to keep the level of extension in context.
 

Summary

In reality despite the best efforts of some media elements to make out that this is a result of defence cuts, one cannot escape the conclusion that this is actually a reasonably sensible decision to make maximum use of troops and resources and is probably safer for all concerned. Even though UK troops will be largely hands off by the end of HERRICK, there is always a risk when units rotate, as tired troops and green troops mix in a combination where mistakes can happen. It is surely better to get through a period where things may be more challenging, and work with troops who although tired, are aware of the challenges and comfortable with operating in Afghanistan.
 

Similarly, it would seem a better use of the UKs wider training regime to not spend significant time putting troops through OPTAG and the work up cycle (not to mention issuing kit that will be written off) for a tour that at best would last 8 weeks at the other end of HERRICK. Looking at the bigger picture, surely using the troops that would have theoretically done the final HERRICK to instead help regenerate the wider Army and its ability to focus on contingent, not current, operations is a much more sensible move.
 

Looking more widely, the legacy of HERRICK will be broad, and in the publics eye, they will not realise that for many of us who served there, it was about doing a job which was important (albeit at times frustrating) but where the individual risk was far less than friends and family at home thought. The challenge now may be to try and build a narrative over time which accurately records the work done, as while the heroic bravery of those who fought in the FOBs and Green Zone rightly deserves to be remembered, equally it is important to understand the work done by those who worked in the MOBs, doing training, support and logistics. It is perhaps a cruel irony that the arguably most important part of HERRICK (the final withdrawal and closedown) is the one which will enjoy the least understanding, despite it demonstrating the UKs considerable reach and capability when it comes to logistical parts of military operations.
 

Whatever happens, one must see the announcement though as a sensible decision made for the right reasons, and not as some kind of knee jerk reaction to the prospects of a smaller military to come.

CVF, the NAO and a lot of missing capability...

The National Audit Office report (NAO) into the decision by the UK MOD to change the procurement of the new carriers from the conventional to the short take off variant (CTOL and VSTOL respectively) has been released. The full report can be found HERE, and is well worth a read. At some 40 pages long, it provides a fascinating insight into one of the more controversial decisions taken in the last few years. 

The background to the situation was the decision taken in the 2010 Strategic Defence Review to modify construction of the two CVF vessels from carrying the VSTOL variant of the F35, to carrying the CTOL variant. This change would also allow the planned F35 buy to not only carry out the Carrier Strike mission, but also fulfil the RAF Deep Penetration Offensive Capability (DPOC) requirement, which in turn was borne out of the old Future Offensive Air System (FOAS), which was designed to replace the Tornado GR4. Under SDSR, the intent was that the RN would only operate one carrier, but with CTOL aircraft embarked, while the second hull would either be sold off or held in long term reserve.

Following an in-depth appraisal of the costs and technical challenges associated with the project, and coming at a point when the 2011 equipment plan was proving highly challenging to bring in on time and on budget (a key aim of the current Government was to balance the equipment programme), the decision was taken to revert back to the previous plan. The NAO report was intended to investigate this decision and identify how much was spent in total reverting back to previous plans.

In total the NAO estimates that some £74 million was spent on the project which must be written off – a fairly substantial expenditure to incur in just two years. But, it also highlights that due to the decision to cancel now, further losses of nearly £750 million were avoided which were likely to have been incurred had the decision been taken to go with the EMALS catapult system. Additionally it notes that entry to service would have been delayed by some three years – unacceptably long to CDS.

The report will no doubt be chewed over for some time to come by many on the internet and wider media. But Humphrey wanted to highlight a couple of factors in the report which struck him as being particularly interesting. Firstly, the report perhaps shows the immense difficulty associated with making changes to major defence projects these days. When procuring expensive equipment, much of which is often unproven and not fully derisked, there is a large financial burden attached to this. The reality is that if you want to have world leading capabilities, you need to be prepared to invest a lot of capital and have a large pool of funds available for the inevitable cost growth as things go wrong.

To the author the fact that the MOD actually cancelled the project is significant – making a ‘U-Turn’ to a ‘U-Turn’ is never easy and politically extremely difficult. One should be hopeful that although money was written off, the fact that the MOD felt able to recommend the abandonment early on shows that the days of ploughing on with projects, throwing ever greater amounts of money into it are perhaps drawing to a close. It would have been very easy for Ministers to reject the recommendation and take far less political heat for doing so than cancelling – do not underestimate how difficult taking this decision would have been.

CVF

The view from the Crowsnest

The next point of interest is the details in the report as to how long it will be before CVF is fully operational. On current plans QUEEN ELIZABETH will begin sea training within a couple of years, and start to embark helicopters and conduct limited marinisation trials of the JSF. But the report notes that we are still 10 years away from seeing a fully worked up carrier group capable of carrying not only the F35, but also a fully operational AEW capability in the form of the Crowsnest project. This project is the successor to the ASACS Sea King variant, which is being withdrawn in 2016. The project has repeatedly been deferred in recent years, and it now looks as if the MOD will not have a full capability until 2023 – this will mean that there will be a seven year gap when the RN hasn’t got any AEW capability while the system is worked up.

In practical terms this is not as terrifying as it may sound – to all intents and purposes the AEW capability has hardly been exercised at sea for many years now, with the ASACS fleet instead working primarily in OP HERRICK. Outside of some limited deployments for ELLAMY it is hard to recall when the RN last put the AEW capability to sea in a credible manner. The ASACS force is a phenomenal ISTAR platform and has genuinely superb capabilities, but it has very much become a purple asset used across defence and not just a carrier asset.

Additionally, if one considers that by 2023, the UK is unlikely to have significant numbers of F35 in service (open source publications are hinting at a squadron by 2016, which may mean further squadron by 2022) then one realises that CVF in its early years is going to have a sparse flight deck. The chances of needing an AEW capability is slim as for the first few years of its life, there simply wont be that many aircraft to fly off the deck needing it. So, on the one hand we should naturally be concerned that a very expensive aircraft carrier capability will not see its full potential, but on the other hand, the loss of AEW by itself is unlikely to make a major difference to the utilisation of CVF in the first few years.

What is perhaps more worrying is the hints in the report that the MOD has deferred expenditure on the associated MARS supply ships until after the next defence review. There is a requirement to replace the now very elderly ‘Fort’ class stores ships which support the carrier fleet, the oldest of which are now nearly 35 years old. Deferring the decision on ordering the replacement (likely to be a three hull class) means that the MOD will have to run on the very elderly fleet of RFAs well into the 2020s. It is all very well having a brand new aircraft carrier, but when you are reliant on a nearly 40 year old store ship to provide your dry supplies, you suddenly have a critical point of failure.

The problem is that RFAs seem to lack the high profile support needed to get through difficult planning rounds (one only has to look at the continuous deferment of the MARS programme to date). The CVF is a great capability but it needs to be fully supported, not just by aircraft and escort ships, but also by a proper fleet support chain. The question is surely how effective will CVF be if she has to rely on Fort Austin or Fort Victoria to provide the logistics to stay at sea?

Increasingly it is becoming clear that while the CVF offers amazing capability on paper, the reality is that until the mid 2020s it will not provide a truly modern capability able to generate carrier strike and operate with modern ships, escorts and aircraft. In the rush to get the carrier into the programme, one must wonder whether too little attention has been paid to prioritising the support elements, as funding was instead diverted to land based operations over the last decade. The author has a vision in his head of a lonely CVF with maybe six jets and a small number of helicopters in the early 2020s, escorted by a middle aged type 45 (youngest will be 10 years old), an elderly Type 23 (youngest will be 20 years old) and a geriatric stores ship (over 40 years old). Is this really the positive young and modern Royal Navy we so desperately want to be proud of?

F35

RAF Woes
More broadly the report highlights the wider problems facing the UK. Firstly it notes that the RAF scrapped the DPOC requirement, meaning that there is going to be no replacement for the Tornado GR4 until the 2030s as the Typhoon OSD approaches. In practical terms this means the RAF is losing a very substantial chunk of capability within the next few years without replacement. The Tornado force is already beginning to be run down, and is likely to be out of service by 2018 without direct replacement. This means the RAF will have lost over 140 airframes, and a huge swathe of capability. In the same timeframe it will be operating a Typhoon force optimised for air defence, and which seemingly still hasn’t got a fully integrated ability to operate Storm Shadow or Brimstone (both immensely capable weapons) and which will have only a limited number of assets to cover both the air defence and expeditionary warfare roles. If as publicly reported the JSF is only beginning to enter service in very limited numbers, then you quickly realise just how limited RAF capability will be soon. In 2003 it operated four fast jet fleets totalling some 450 aircraft, but by 2018, barely 15 years later it will be down to the Typhoon fleet which is likely to only have some 100 aircraft operational at anyone time, and also maybe 16 JSF as a shared RN/RAF asset.

While it is fashionable in some internet forums to knock the RAF as an evil conspirator trying to destroy RN fixed wing aviation, one only has to look at the scale of how bad things are getting for the RAF to understand how limited the UKs air expeditionary capability is likely to be until the mid 2020s when the Typhoon and JSF force are hopefully at full strength. We are in for a period of at least 10 years when the RAF will be a far less capable force than before, with little hope of seeing capability reintroduced for at least further 10-15 years. One wonders whether the decision to scrap the DPOC programme will go down as one of the most rued decisions of future generations of RAF planners.

Finally one has to consider the financial challenges ahead. Humphrey has previously written about the problems of the current equipment programme funding, and the limited ability to absorb risk in the contingency fund. Reading the NAO report one notes that firstly the cost of absorbing the operation of a second carrier could be as high as £60 million per year, which would be extremely challenging to find in the current RN budget without commensurate cuts elsewhere. Secondly it notes that the costs of the CVF project is likely to rise as final costings are not yet known – given the limited ability of the EP to absorb cost growth, one has to worry about the 2015 defence review and whether sufficient funding really exists to bring the carriers into service without having to make further cuts to other programmes.

Conclusions

The NAO report makes for interesting and frankly worrying reading. While for years many have gone on about how capable the RN will be once CVF enters service, the fact remains that the UK is procuring a capability where cost is growing, and where the final bill for producing a fully worked up carrier group is likely to be extremely expensive. The fact that the MOD is having to defer and take risk elsewhere means that while in time the CVF will provide the UK with a truly world class ability, there is likely to be a prolonged period into the mid 2020s where one wonders whether the carrier strike ability is more Potemkin than we would perhaps like. ..

A tale of Two Defence Reviews - thoughts on the French and Australian defence review

In the last week or so there have been two major Defence Reviews announced in France and Australia. Both nations are close partners of the UK and significant powers on the global stage, which means that these results are of direct interest to the UK.

 

The announcement of the French Defence Review, reported back on the future structure of the French military for the next 10 years. Essentially akin to the UK SDSR, the work was designed to address French budget challenges, and try to create a sustainable force which is affordable in the near future. The Think Defence website has helpfully collected a summary of all the reporting on the event (HERE) which are well worth reading.

 

In many ways the review highlights the challenging position France finds itself in at the start of the 21^st Century. Unlike the UK, the French have never had an ‘East of Suez’ moment, and arguably French policy for many years has been to continue projecting a low level amount of power across the globe, while retaining a smaller cadre of higher capability equipment at home. To this day, France still retains bases in South America, Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific Islands, all of which play home to small amounts of troops and equipment, as much for legacy ‘imperial policing’ in their overseas territories as it is for projection of power more widely.

 

It is clear that Mali has already highlighted many lessons for the French Military, including a paucity of strategic airlift, and a perhaps worrying reliance on foreign militaries for a wide range of assets when taking part in intervention operations. This perhaps explains the emphasis on a future force built and optimised for a French ‘rapid reaction’ capability, and seems intended to deliver a military with around 7 intervention brigades and some 200 main battle tanks (e.g. a very similar size to the British Army under Force 2020).

 

The French Navy will see itself reduced down to no more than 15 first line escorts, plus some 20  patrol ships and light frigates for policing and constabulary duties overseas. The long delayed plan to build a second carrier is now officially cancelled, leaving France as a part time carrier navy, particularly given that Charles De Gaulle requires relatively regular refuelling, which can often take several years to do. The SSBN and SSN force levels remain unchanged.

 

The French Air Force will focus efforts on the acquisition of new tanker aircraft to replace its positively ancient KC135 fleet, and will in future consolidate around no more than 225 Rafale aircraft as its sole fast jet fleet. There will be continued investment in transport, ISTAR and other assets, although fleet sizes will be reduced.

 

The overall effect of the review will be some 34,000 job losses across all three services, and a near flat level of growth in the budget for at least the next five years.

 

What does this mean?

In many ways this review mirrors the SDSR in that it takes a capable military power with financial problems and tries to make structural adjustments to solve said problems. It is telling that there is still no real change in French strategic posture around the globe, and that as a nation, France will try to continue being a global power, albeit one on an ever tighter budget. Recent lessons in Mali would suggest that France can exert real influence in Africa, and that this area may well be the French ‘area of investment’ over the next decade. While the days of the Francophonie are declining, it is clear that French bases continue to be a useful strategic asset in a region where economies are booming, while stability remains volatile. One suspects that any further reviews will see closure in other overseas departments, such as in French Polynesia ahead of Africa.

 

The fundamental problem that faces France though is that it still seems unclear as to whether it wants to remain a nation capable of operating as lead nation in areas of interest, or if it wants to contribute to wider coalition operations. On the one hand it retains a ‘golf bag’ of useful assets and capabilities, but these are often limited in number and increasing in age. At the same time there seems a deep reluctance on the part of the French to restructure their forces to fit in with wider coalition operations. Decades of operating outside the NATO military structure have perhaps created a mentality of ‘we can do this alone’, which was fine when budgets could match aspiration, but is perhaps more difficult now.

 

The question is what does France bring to a multi-national operation that can’t be done by the UK or Germany or other NATO powers? Its troops have limited experience of working in coalition environments, and its military clearly has many capability gaps (as seen by experiences in Mali). At its harshest, the issue is whether France has the right force mix of assets and troops to be a valuable member of international missions, or whether its focus on ‘shop window’ capabilities like a CVN or Rafale means that it is perhaps less valuable than nations which produce smaller, but more interoperable forces, like the Netherlands or Denmark.

 

The wider problem facing the French is that this review has perhaps steered clear of the most challenging problem which is to deal with how a nation which traditionally takes pride in a ‘French solution’ will continue to be able to afford capabilities in future. One only has to look at the emerging list of requirements for the French military for the next 20 years to realise that new carriers, new fast jets, new tanks, new SSBNs and associated deterrence capability are all required and that there probably isn’t enough money to go it alone.

 

The decision to not proceed with a second carrier (having worked with the UK) may well be a cause for concern in 10-15 years time when it is clear that any future carrier replacement will have to be funded alone, without benefits of joint co-operation. The PA2 would have offered some economies of scale, but now any French replacement will need to be designed as a likely single hull at a point when no other European nation is likely to need a carrier built. This will make it extremely expensive to replace the Charles De Gaulle. Similarly, while Rafale is a reasonably competent aircraft now, the costs of not only sustaining it for the long term, and then bringing a successor into service in both Ari Force and Naval service will be phenomenally expensive – one only has to look at the costs associated with the F35 to realise just how expensive modern aircraft are. Given any replacement programme will be due at a point when the deterrent is also likely to need replacing, one feels that the French may have to make some extremely tough decisions in about 20 years time. While it is hard to see Gallic pride permitting the abandonment of either a carrier or nuclear capability, the issue is what is hollowed out or deleted elsewhere in the force structure to pay for this capability. The worry for French planners may be that in order to preserve a few high profile capabilities, the French military as a whole will struggle to afford them and remain a credible force.

 

So, France finds itself in a really interesting position – on the one hand their defence review seems to assume that little has changed, and that a smaller military will continue to do much the same as before, but there seems to be an avoidance of publicly discussing the very real challenges to the long term ability of France to stay on this course. At some point something will have to give, and there seems no clear lead from this paper as to what that may be. In the interim the French will remain a power capable of some power projection of headline capabilities, while remaining reliant on other nations to support them.

 

Meanwhile Down Under…

At the same time Australia has announced a defence review which seems to have been linked more to electoral ambition than due to timing. The review publicised this week was brought forward ahead of  what is likely to be tightly fought election. It suggests that Australia will continue to commit to the procurement of up to 100 F35s, while purchasing interim F18s to keep their fast jet capability alive. At the same time it reconfirmed that Australia would design and build a force of some 12 SSKs using an indigenous design and not an ‘off the shelf’ variant.

 

The first challenge for the review is to identify where the money is coming from to pay for this – by all accounts the review is long on aspiration but relatively short on details about where the funding is to pay for this. Earlier this year it became clear that under current plans the Australian military would probably need to look at its budgets again with a view to cutting expenditure, so whether this review is anything more than a list of aspirations remains to be seen. There is no guarantee that post-election it will be funded by either party, depending on the economic situation.

 

To this author the chances of Australia being able to fund the design and purchase of 12 SSKs seems slim. Warship design capability is an incredibly complex business (as discussed elsewhere on this site) and at present Australia doesn’t possess a submarine design capability. The RAN has struggled to recruit and retain sufficient people to keep a force built around six hulls operational, so it is hard to see that changing soon. Baring an influx of ex RN and RCN submariners, the question is whether the RAN can actually get sufficient manpower through its training schools and out into the fleet to keep such a force operational. Otherwise, the worry must surely be that it will spend a great deal of money building a capability that its never designed before, and doubling its force in size at the same time. This could pose a real challenge to their long term stability, and again may come at significant cost to the rest of the fleets capabilities.

 

Similarly, the commitment to 100 F35s is welcome, as it helps stabilise the prices somewhat, but any future reduction in orders could have wider implications for the US and UK as unit prices rise. What is interesting though is the way that Australia appears to be linking itself into the US as its key gurantor of security (e.g. purchases of US equipment, allowing bases in Australia) as the US seeks to rebalance itself into a pacific power. At the same time though, the question may be does Australia feel comfortable aligning its equipment programme so firmly with one nation. There is no certainty that the US will always provide the parts required, which means for a nation like Australia, broadly dependent on others to produce equipment, the question is where else to buy? One senses an opportunity for the UK to sell the Global Combat Ship (GCS) design (known as Type 26 in the RN) to Australia as a means of producing a good design quickly and at low cost. As the ANZACs come to the end of their lifespan, the GCS could be a good solution to ensure that while the RAN is aligned firmly to the USN, it is not entirely dependent on it for all aspects of its equipment.

 

So, the challenge for Australia is two-fold – firstly it needs to be able to afford the equipment it has set out to buy. Then it needs to find the manpower to be able to operate this equipment, which in a small country is not always easy. As a large country, with a small population in a region where economic growth is increasing and there are many militaries with large manpower and growing resources, Australia needs to play a careful game. Not to become too aligned to the courses of action of one power, but as it is too small to be able to effectively stand alone, it needs to exercise a careful mix of diplomacy and tact, while ensuring its military can resist any external threat. This is not going to be an easy task, and one that can only get more difficult as budgets shrink.

 

What does this mean for the UK?

So, the question now is what do both of these reviews mean for the UK? Both France and Australia remain some of the closest allies to the UK, and it is likely that future military operations will involve one or both powers in some way. In practical terms the reviews continue to confirm that the French will be useful partners, but that they will be more useful at providing headline capabilities, and that planning for joint operations will probably see a heavier reliance on UK logistical and support capability. At the same time, the Australian  review is useful to confirm that Australia will remain a first tier power, and that its continued presence in the Indian Ocean and Middle East means that the UK will have reason to work with them, even in the post HERRICK/TELIC environment. Similarly, the French will also have reason to work with the Australians in both the Gulf and also the Pacific Rim – all three nations share some common areas of interest and a ll three nations find themselves in challenging strategic positions – powers with a sense of global responsibility, but constrained budgets and a realisation that individually they are unable to do as much as they would wish. The next two decades will prove to be increasingly challenging, as we collectively seek to do more together, while struggling to afford the replacements of capabilities previously taken for granted, while dealing with emerging powers with the money, manpower and resources which enable them to pose a real challenge. Whatever happens, it will certainly prove to be an interesting time…

To Build or not to Build - Thoughts on exporting warships

In the last article, Humphrey looked at the reasons why the RN would probably never operate a US supercarrier. In the closing parts of the article, it focused a bit more broadly on the challenges of sustaining a national shipbuilding capability, and also growing that into an export capability. In this article, which loosely follows on from the previous piece, the author wants to consider the very real challenge of exporting high end warships overseas. Due to time constraints this piece is being spread over a couple of articles, and posted as the authors real world commitments permit.

The first question is – what is a high end warship? Twenty people could probably offer twenty answers, but for the purposes of this article, Humphrey is assuming high end means large vessel (eg FFG class or above), fitted with modern weapons systems, aviation facilities and supported by up to date electronics and C2 facilities, and able to operate across the full range of maritime operations, from low level sovereignty reassurance patrols all the way up to high end kinetic warfighting. Traditionally such a vessel would have been called a Frigate or Destroyer, although the nature of maritime forces these days means it could theoretically be anything from a Corvette up to an LPD.

On first examination it is worth considering that the global market for such vessels is paradoxically smaller now than it has been for many years. While there are plenty of naval construction campaigns going on across the globe, most of them involve very simple ships – e.g. Offshore Patrol Vessels or landing craft. Most nations have the ability to design and build this sort of vessel, and which operate not only in Navies, but also the wider maritime tapestry such as Coastguards or law enforcement agencies. One only has to look at the UK to realise that beyond the traditional Royal Navy, there lies a very complex web of maritime security capability, ranging from small MOD police launches, all the way up to OPVs, operated by a number of Government departments.

Instead, looking more broadly and it is a bit of struggle to see an extensive market for new build high capability warships. One only has to look at a naval guide from 20 or 30 years ago to realise how much the market has changed. Back then many nations which didn’t traditionally operate escorts were moving into commissioning new ones, often through modular designs like the German MEKO class. The availability of a large number of cheap older warships on the export market, particularly the RN Type 12 and Leander derivatives, not only from the UK but other nations, meant a good number of Navies were able to consider getting rid of WW2 designs and bring into service more modern vessels. As these vessels themselves aged, naturally thoughts turned to bringing replacement classes into service. There is a sense when browsing naval guides of the 1980s that the market for warships remained buoyant. The end of the Cold War perhaps marked the first decline in this market – the changing security situation led to a glut of new and often barely used escorts being disposed of by NATO nations – one only has to look at the plethora of FFG7s and Type 22s disposed of during the 1990s, along with a number of older vessels too (Leanders and FF1052s) also sold off. This meant many nations were able to acquire frigates to replace their older ones without having to consider ordering new – great for budgets, less great news for hard pressed shipyards.

Move forward to 2013 and we find ourselves in an interesting situation – the vessels acquired during the end of Cold War garage sale are now aging and thoughts turn to replacement. But, the second hard warship market is vastly smaller than it was a few years ago, with far less warships available for purchase. The US has only a few FFG7s left in service, and is moving to decommissioning some CG47s soon. Compared to twenty years ago there are hardly any modern US warships available for purchase, and it seems highly unlikely that any DDG51s will be disposed of for some time yet. At the same time the RN has seemingly blocked the sale of any more Type 23s, and those ships it has disposed off (T22Cs and T42s) have attracted no overseas sales. So the traditional suppliers of second hand warships have far less to offer, and are in future far less likely to be willing to decommission those few hulls they have left – an RN of 19 escorts and a USN of barely 80 will be very reluctant to lose ships early baring major financial crisis.

With a limited pool of quality second hand vessels available, the question then becomes what do navies operating existing frigates do? You can only update  a design for so long before it becomes life expired. While saying ‘buy a new class’ may seem the obvious answer, it is not as straightforward as may be thought. Bringing a new vessel class into service is extremely complicated. One only has to look at the challenges facing the RN or USN in the introduction of the Type 45 or the LCS vessels to realise that even world class navies find introduction of exceptionally complex platforms to be challenging. The task of bringing a brand new vessel class into service without any other navy to turn to who has already operated it – one of the appeals of the second hand warship market is that the vessel you are buying has been brought into service, hugely derisked, problems ironed out and you usually have a benevolent navy standing by to offer support with training, spares and upgrades (for a small fee of course!). New vessel classes come with no such reassurance, and the navy introducing the vessels will often find itself dealing with these challenges alone, with only the manufacturer for company.

 

The next issue with new build hulls is where do you buy them? Do you rely on the support of an overseas yard, which may have more experience of building vessels, or do you instead seek to build capacity at home, even if there is less experience?

Therefore it is perhaps natural that many navies have preferred to buy the hulls second hand, and then do far more limited refits at home, rather than risk introducing a new platform into service themselves, which can often be ruinously expensive for a small number of units.

The next challenge is the sheer complexity of designing a high end warship. The UK has made clear that its own position is that while shipbuilding for less complex military vessels can be contracted out on occasion (for instance the MARS tanker programme), the ability to design such vessels in the first place is critical. The MARS programme highlighted the importance of retaining an indigenous warship design capability, and one reason for the various UK shipbuilding terms of business agreements is to ensure sufficient work to keep the design capability alive, even if there is a slow reduction in actual construction.

Warship design has always been complicated; you are merging the combination of basic hull design, propulsion, life support, damage control and combat capability and turning it into something which can operate effectively. Add in the phenomenally complicated amount of electronic equipment needed, and you quickly realise that even a relatively simple modern high end design requires a level of skill and ability which is far beyond that of many nations. Pretty much any nation can make a design which looks impressive on the outside, but far fewer have the ability to turn an impressive design into a working and competent design that can actually integrate its systems together to become more than the sum of its parts. This is one reason why so many modern warship designs take longer than anticipated to bring into service – the building is (relatively speaking) straight forward, but getting all the bits to work properly together and then fight the ship is a totally different ballgame altogether.

So, right now the export market for high end warships finds itself in a curious position. There are many navies out there who operate escort platforms which are starting to approach the end of their lives, and who are considering replacement, but who do not have the resources to consider buying new. At the same time, there are other navies out there operating vessels which they’d like to upgrade as part of the growth in their naval power, but who lack the ability to design (and often build) vessels in their home market. What this means as we move forward is how do the problems of designing and building vessels get solved and what does it mean for the warship export market?

In the next part of this article, Humphrey intends to consider the current challenges facing UK shipbuilding as it looks to the future, and what other nations are doing to build up, or replace their existing escort fleets, and whether we can draw any lessons from it.

Could the RN really operate a US Aircraft carrier?

Humphrey has been suffering from a nasty virus recently which has left him out of action and unable to write. While firmly recovering now, he has had time to catch up on various bits of reading, both articles and on the internet. One issue which caught his interest was a subject which seems to perennially come up in various forums, particularly on ARRSE, which is the question about why the UK (or presumably certain other close allies) have not gone down the road of leasing an American aircraft carrier for introduction to the RN, either to fill the gap between CVF entering service, or alternatively in place of CVF. It is a question which has often been asked, but Humphrey has never seen anywhere set out in depth why it hasn’t happened and what has stopped it occurring in the past. As such, the aim of this article is to try and set out the arguments underpinning why leasing/buying a US carrier is simply not feasible. This in turn forms the loose first part of a two part article on warship exporting in more general terms.

For the purposes of this article, one is considering the practicality of whether such a move could occur -on cost grounds alone such a move seems unlikely, but one needs to suspend disbelief to consider this proposition anyway! 

On paper it does seem to be an interesting proposition – the US has been constructing aircraft carriers on a near continuous basis for over 60 years, and has a wealth of knowledge about how they can be built, and the shipyard facilities to support this. The argument as usually put forward is that rather than build CVF, it would be just as efficient to either lease a ‘spare’ carrier (particularly in the post sequestration environment where they are spending more time alongside) or just pay for the US to build one.

The first challenge to this idea is a very simple problem. There is no military dockyard anywhere in the UK which can accommodate a US supercarrier alongside. Were the UK to acquire one, it would either have to create an entirely new facility at an existing commercial port (e.g. Southampton) or it would have to base the vessels in the US. The creation of a new facility would be a particular challenge, as any nuclear powered vessel would require discrete berthing with security procedures to take into account the presence of nuclear reactors. One only has to consider the security in place to support the SSN/SSBN fleet to realise what would be needed for the CVN. The creation of any extra facility at a point when the RN is trying to reduce its shore based footprint would cost a great deal.

So if we have nowhere to moor the vessel, we have yet to consider the problem of propulsion. The USN no longer has any active conventionally powered super carriers, the last decommissioning a few years ago. This means that any lease / build would need to be from a nuclear powered design. The UK has never operated any surface vessels with nuclear propulsion (standfast a few tentative designs in the 1960s) and would find it a challenge to bring such a capability into service – this is without even considering the likely challenge of finding a home port which would want to see a nuclear powered aircraft carrier based there. The most significant challenge of operating a nuclear carrier would be the lack of any suitably qualified personnel to run the reactors, and then over time the drain on manpower from the wider nuclear qualified fleet. Retaining suitably qualified and experienced nuclear watchkeeping personnel is a major challenge for the RN to keep its SSN and SSBN fleet at sea – indeed one reason why the RN is allowing women to sea in submarines is arguably to help increase the potential numbers of engineers who it can recruit. While Humphrey doesn’t have the exact numbers to hand, it would be a reasonable assumption that to man a single US CVN would require the greater part of the RNs current level of nuclear trained personnel, which would have a very challenging impact on the wider fleet.

Manpower more broadly is a major challenge – it is often forgotten that the future RN manpower plot isn’t actually that big. Of a headcount of some 30,000 people, by the time you’ve stripped out the Royal Marines, Fleet Air Arm and Submarine Service, you’re left with roughly 15000 people to do everything else. A single US carrier needs some 3200 personnel just to operate the ship – by the time you work on the 3:1 ratio (e.g. to keep one person at sea requires three people in the Service) then a single carrier would require well over 9000 people in the manning pool. This is before you even consider the size of the airwing. So, even if the RN acquired a carrier it would need to stop manning the majority of the surface fleet in order to put her to sea.

If we were to assume that the manpower could, somehow, be found, then we still have the major issue of training and spare parts. US and RN warships are very different beasts, with each reflecting national design preferences. There is relatively little commonality of systems, structures or methods of operation and in taking on a USN vessel the RN would have to spend a very significant amount of time training staff to use it to best effect. There would be a large bill attached to this (e.g. creation of courses, establishment of training pipelines, refresher training and the like) which would be required just to support a single ship. Similarly, the US has a very different set of parts and technical systems in service – any carrier acquisition would require the RN to adopt an entirely new and very separate supply chain at great expense. One challenge of buying from the US is that you would be entirely reliant of the largesse of the US system to allow the sale of spare parts – the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system is a classic example whereby the US sells a lot of basic equipment cheaply, but ties the buyer into long term supply contracts to provide its equipment, and its support to the customer. It is likely that the RN would find itself tied into very expensive US support contracts which would do wonders for the US economy but not support UK national preferences. Our ability to modify the carrier to suit our own purposes would also be reduced – in other words, buying the Carrier would probably mean buying into the US support system too. This is fine for a technologically less mature military which perhaps lacks the industrial and technological support base to run vessels, but it does mean that the RN would find itself hamstrung. By contrast CVF gives the UK total freedom of manoeuvre to change / modify or update the vessel and her systems in any manner that we see fit.

Finally one has to consider the issue of the airwing – the value of a supercarrier is being able to put up to 90 airframes to sea and position them where the US Government sees fit. The problem for the RN is that the funding does not exist to buy such an airwing, nor does the manpower exist to do so. Sending a single CVN airwing to sea would take up the majority of the Fleet Air Arms current manpower, to the detriment of most other tasks.

So, we find ourselves in a situation where to consider buying an supercarrier for the RN requires us to realise that there is nowhere to house it, not enough crew to man it, not enough aircraft to fly from it and the costs of training and supplying a single ship would be astronomical. This is to not even consider the wider damage to the UK shipbuilding capability that would result from a distortion of budget funds away from home grown construction in favour of supporting US industry.

This last point is perhaps key – we live in an era where many nations find themselves in possession of a military ship design and building capability, but where ever fewer nations seem able to secure export orders. One only has to look around the world to realise that the market for complex warships is diminishing, and where the loss of design skills probably means the end of a national capability to build complex vessels. Just look at the case of the MARS tankers, where even though they are being built in Korea, the key requirement was the protection of the UK design capability which was vital.

Increasingly warship construction is as much about economic security (e.g. protection of national assets like shipyards) as it is about physical security. The loss of an order may mean the end of a national capability to build warships. Buying from the US would mean the UK quite probably losing the ability to construct high end vessels, and as Canada is finding out now, the cost of re-establishing a shipbuilding industry is huge (see the excellent 3D’s blog by Mark Collins for more detail on the ongoing saga of Canadian shipbuilding). All those advocating the acquisition of US carriers for the Royal Navy should perhaps consider that it would not only be entirely unfeasible to support, train or operate one, but to do so may end our independent capability to build complex warships at all.

 As a follow up, the author wants to consider whether there is a market for warship exporting at all in future, and what it may look like. Time willing, the loose part two to this article will follow in the next week or so.

What is the legacy of Lady Thatcher for the Armed Forces?

The news that former UK Prime Minister Baroness Margaret Thatcher has died has led to a wide ranging series of social debates in the UK over the legacy of the former Prime Minister. It is rare to see the death of a national leader lead to such strident debate, not only at home, but also abroad – normally the death of a PM attracts a short amount of coverage in the UK, perhaps a couple of one paragraph articles in foreign newspapers and a quiet funeral in an obscure part of the nation. The death of Baroness Thatcher has led to a wide ranging and very polarized debate between those who were strongly in support of her, and those who see her legacy as less positive.

Normally Humphrey tries to steer clear of political matters in this blog, but he’s decided to try and put across some very personal views on this subject due to the fact that the life and legacy of Baroness Thatcher was more than just political, and that in many ways she transcended politics in her reputation in order to become something more potent. Whatever her wider political actions, there was one area where she had arguably a long lasting impact and bequeathed a very long term legacy, and this was with the Armed Forces and Defence in general.

From one perspective Lady Thatcher enjoyed an extremely close and very personal relationship with HM Forces that transcended the normal political/military divide. Over the years some politicians have had better relationships with the military than others – speak to any Military Officer or MOD Civil Servant with experience of dealing with Ministers, and after a couple of drinks then they’ll usually be happy to pass observations on who was ‘rated’ and who was not. Generally this had nothing to do with political party or views, but on the ability of the individual and the manner with which they were able to get on with the unique combination of military culture and lifestyle which permeates the department.

Lady Thatcher, despite never having held any office within Defence, seemed to enjoy a tremendous and mutually held respect within the Armed Forces. This was not for her political views,  but because in her ethos, attitude and manner of conduct, she seemed to place an emphasis and importance on the sort of values that are at the very heart of military culture. This, coupled with her realisation that in many ways after 1982 her continued hold on the Premiership owed much to the Falklands War victory, meant that she bestowed a great deal of affection on the armed forces. This is perhaps borne out by the reaction on sites such as the Army Rumour service or PPRUNE forums where a genuine sense of loss can be felt.

This closeness has never been seen to be bestowed in any other currently serving politician; while many recent PMs and Ministers have had good working relationships with the military, it is hard to see the same level of affection and mutual respect exist for any other politician of any party. That being said, other than Winston Churchill, it is hard to think of any other 20^th Century Prime Minister or politician who enjoyed a similar status.

One way of conducting a cabinet reshuffle?

A Long Term Legacy?

One of the challenges of managing Defence is that decisions taken now will have to be implemented and supported for decades to come. One only has to look at the CVF project, where initial design work began in the mid 1990s for the replacement CVS studies, for a design that will not enter service till 2018 and which is likely to remain in service until the 2050s or beyond. One example of this long term impact can be found today in some the decisions taken in the 1981 defence review – for instance the structure of the RN is still inherently built around not only the SSBN fleet, but also the Type 23 Frigates. The decision to implement a small, cheap and size limited design as part of the review is a decision which made sense given the operational imperatives at the time (namely ASW in the GIUK gap), but which has hamstrung the modern RN and will lead to major changes to the Type 26 force. One of Lady Thatcher’s legacies to this day is that current Governments are having to work with a force structure which was largely bestowed on them by the Labour and Conservative Governments of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In particular, the decision to commit to the replacement of Polaris with Trident has ensured that the current administration is faced with the challenge of taking tough politicial and financial decisions as a direct result of decisions taken over 30 years ago. This is perhaps a useful reminder in a generation where it is difficult to find people who can think in terms of more than one electoral cycle ahead – namely that some decisions will have ramifications for decades hence, and that your successors are very much tied into the decisions that you make today.

A Global Presence Restored?

One area where Lady Thatcher had perhaps more impact than she is widely given credit for is the re-establishment of the UK as a globally deployed military power. The context of the 1970s was one of retrenchment, withdrawal and an ever deepening focus on supporting the Inner German Border as the central point for all defence planning. Margaret Thatcher was the first Prime Minister to come to power who had not played a role in the previous 15-20 years of Imperial withdrawal and refocusing on NATO. While she had roles in Government, she did not handle any Defence or Foreign portfolio matters. It is perhaps noteworthy that one of her earliest military engagements was not only the deployment of Royal Marines to the New Hebrides, but also the deployment of Royal Navy vessels to Armilla to focus on the increasing security threat in the Gulf. Well over 30 years later and the RN is still deployed in the Gulf, and in ever great numbers (today at any one time over 25% of the RN is deployed East of Suez). The Falklands War naturally marks the most well known of her wider military engagements, but it is telling that throughout her premiership, she was a strident supporter for the deployment of UK forces outside of their traditional operating area (for instance the significant Exercise Saif Sareea in Oman in 1986), bucking the trends of previous years. In the very twilight days of her time in Office, she saw through the Options for Change defence review, which not only heralded the end of the Cold War military structure, but also saw the first steps in the UK military re-establishing itself as a much more globally deployable power, as was seen by the deployment to Saudi Arabia in 1990.

This may sound somewhat obvious, but it is worth considering that the current state of UK military capability may well not have existed if a different party had taken power in the 1980s. It is clear that a win by the Labour Party in the 1983 or 1987 General Election would have seen a radically different defence policy implemented, and one which would have seen significantly different force structures imposed on the military – for instance SSBNs, almost certainly SSNs, Carriers and other vessels would have been scrapped as part of wider ranging defence cuts. The political scene in the UK in the early 1980s was perhaps more markedly split between Left and Right than at any other point in recent history. While most elections since then would have had relatively small impacts on the military capability, it is fair to say that history would have turned out tremendously differently had the Labour Party won these elections. Therefore, one direct legacy of Lady Thatcher is that through her actions, she set the conditions for the current military force structure to exist, and to enable current political party leaders to continue have a genuinely global military capability.

This is perhaps a somewhat rose tinted spectacle approach – after all the 1981 Defence Review would have cost the RN its assault ships and reduced the carrier fleet, but the ultimate result though was that despite this initial policy, the legacy of the first leader to not have known withdrawal from East of Suez was to adopt a defence policy which paved the way for a return to Suez and beyond. Her actions directly saw the UK recommitting itself to the Gulf for a generation, and set in train a chain of events which have seen UK forces based there ever since.

A Very Special Relationship?

Of particular importance is the manner in which the strong personal relationship between Lady Thatcher and President Reagan manifested itself in the significant re-invigoration of the Anglo-US alliance. The very genuine bonds of friendship at this level, and the renewed confidence which saw the two leading NATO powers take a far more proactive approach to tackling the challenges of the Soviet Union almost certainly paved the way for the much stronger co-operation of the years that followed. Again, this is a point often forgotten, but by the 1980s, the UK and US were still close, but the relationship perhaps lacked chemistry. Many of those who drove it forward were senior, approaching retirement and perhaps it owed more to their shared wartime experiences than it did about current matters. The series of events, such as the re-engagement on the global stage, success in the Falklands, and the later joint work to tackle the Soviet Union, as well as wider engagement helped restore the UKs reputation and working relationship for a new generation of military and civilian staff. This is not to say that the Anglo-US relationship would have further declined without Lady Thatcher, but it was definitely given a fillip that helped reinvigorate it. The impact of this was the ability for the UK to restore its place at the side of the US as a genuinely credible ally, which has endured to this day. Again, this is not something that should be taken for granted, as the election of the Labour party in 1983 / 1987 would have seen the emergence of a Government committed to the withdrawal of US forces from UK soil, and with it the likely ending of the Anglo-US alliance. It is fair to say that the legacy of Lady Thatcher is that the relationship is far strong now than it could well have been. Of course actions speak louder than words, and much of the strength of the relationship comes from willingness by the UK to offer troops, diplomatic support and other measures to work with the US. But, this can only come about if there is willingness at the top of Government to see this level of commitment. Lady Thatcher set the tone for a reinvigoration of the relationship that all of her successors since have seen fit to continue to support.

A war that redefined a nation

One area for which she will always be remembered, but for which it is challenging to identify specific a legacy is the Falklands War of 1982. While her leadership and position at this time will probably be one of the enduring memories of her premiership, the Falklands remains very much a unique occurrence in British history. If anything perhaps the legacy is the fact that the war came as a timely reminder that the UK continues to have a truly global footprint of interests, which still needed protecting. This came at a point when the UK was seemingly going down the road of having to politically choose between a military entirely optimised for the defence of the Central Front, or one which was essentially a home defence force. The Falklands came as a strong reminder that no matter what the primary threat, the UK needed to retain a broader global intervention capability. Any future defence review will have to be conducted under the ‘Falklands Factor’ – namely that the UK will be expected to be able to do something to intervene in support of its overseas interests, which was not a given even in the 1981 defence review.

Perhaps though the most challenging legacy she left is that of Service pay. In 1979 the armed forces were significantly underpaid compared to the wider population, and morale was low and retention a challenge. Many forces personnel really struggled to get by, and the pay simply wasn’t enough to live a reasonable lifestyle. One of the first acts of the new government was a very substantial pay rise, which in turn started the long road to service pay providing a genuinely competitive salary. This made a real difference to service morale at the time, and it is telling that many of those who served then have remembered this pay rise on their internet forum eulogies. While in the short term this had a positive effect, it could be argued that in fact it set in train the ever increasing challenge of an unaffordable manpower bill. One of the real challenges in Defence today, and often touched on here, is that manpower is now extremely expensive.

One of the reasons the UK could afford large armed forces until the mid-1960s was because the pay was so low by comparison to wider industry that it was possible to have large forces for relatively little cost. By contrast, todays armed forces are phenomenally expensive to pay and employ as their wages bill is out of all proportion compared to the 1960s (even allowing for inflation). By providing the military with a more reasonable salary, the stage was set to see the long running problem of how manage an ever more stretched defence budget – personnel or equipment? This is a problem which has only gotten worse in recent years, and is likely to prove a continued challenge – how do you pay for a military which requires highly specialist skills and experience, and also afford the equipment that goes with this? This is perhaps the most difficult legacy, for in choosing to increase the pay to the armed forces which she supported; the long term reality has been to make them increasingly unaffordable for the nation as a whole.

 



Korearing Out of Control - The situation in Korea

As anyone who follows the news will have seen recently, events on the Korean peninsula seem to be spiralling into a cycle of increasing tension as North Korea continues to provide strong rhetoric against the South and wider nations over the current diplomatic situation, which seems to have culminated so far in a ‘declaration of war’ and news that the Yongbyon reactor will be reopened. How serious is this, and does it really herald war for the peninsula?

 

North Korea is one of the most unusual and terrifyingly Orwellian states on the planet. Imagine a nation where every member of the population has spent the last 60 years being told that they live in a paradise, and that they have the greatest living conditions on earth. Add to this complete state control of the media and broadcast, a network of spies and informants and a gulag archipelago that would make Stalin jealous. Presiding over this nation of some 23 million utterly indoctrinated and militarized people is a tiny elite who enjoy a pampered and privileged lifestyle which provides them with any manner of goods and services. At the very top of this is the ruler Kim Jong Un, who has inherited his position from his father Kim Jong Il. The Kim dynasty are treated almost as gods, and no criticism of any form is officially tolerated.

 

Kim Jong Nam inherited his position from his father, who died in late 2011, and who had a challenging relationship with the outside world. At barely 30 years old and with no military experience or other state experience to speak of, the young Kim lacks the powerbase and support that his father built during his long years as the heir apparent. Kim Jong Il had several children, and appeared reluctant to anoint any one of them as the heir to the throne. By contrast he had spent many years in the shadow of his father, and was able to build some support in the senior echelons of North Korean society, and develop an understanding of how he could rule. The young Kim has none of this, and has been unexpectedly catapulted to power, bereft of the powerbase that can sustain him.

 

While Kim will enjoy the support of the State, he has come to power in a difficult time. The country has not had time to adjust to the thought of him as the leader of the nation – there was seemingly little preparing of the stage over the years for his ascension to the position (e.g. no portraits, TV appearances or any other sign of public presence). At the same time North Koreas position is precarious – the State has survived far longer than most totalitarian states by clamping down on any form of external news and contact with the real world. The combination though of mobile phones, the Internet and other forms of communication, coupled with dreadful famines and a dire economic situation means that while no Arab Spring uprising is likely, for the first time the complete and unquestioning adulation of the masses is not 100% assured. The transit of people out to China, and the slowly more porous northern border means that there is seepage of news and information from the outside world into North Korea. People are in a small way perhaps now realising that the world they inhabit is not a paradise after all.

 

This background is important when trying to understand the context of what we see going on in North Korea now. The rhetoric, the threats, the sense of trying to bring the nation together to unite against the external enemy – all of this seems a good way to help focus peoples minds on an external threat, and to perhaps once again pledge their fealty to Kim.

Kim on guidance visit (copyright news.com.au)

It is telling that there have been multiple photos of Kim appearing in the media while making visits to the armed forces. Kim Jong Il used to do something similar, whereby he would make a regular ‘guidance’ visit to various KPA units and reiterate advice on how things could be done better (a trait of Kim Jong Il was his unerring ability to be a world expert at whatever he turned his mind to apparently). If anything Kim Jong Un has been more prominent in these sorts of visits, where he seems determined to establish his credentials as a military leader. Not a military man by background, and with no real party power base to speak of, he needs to ensure that he can count on the loyalty of the armed forces to support his regime. Photos of him delivering guidance may appear somewhat hammed up to the Western audience, but in North Korea they serve as evidence that Kim has an understanding of the threat and is prepared to meet it.

 

The use of the rhetoric against South Korea and the US is important – it provides a unifying theme and helps focus attention on repelling the long expected attack. At the same time, the attempt to conduct a crude form of ‘nuclear blackmail’ by conducting tests of devices and rockets helps demonstrate Kims credentials as a credible world leader, with the most advanced technology and the ability to dictate terms to the wider world. The problem though is that as Kim is discovering now, it is difficult to back down from the pedestal when the other side don’t react as you expect them to.

 

The reaction from the wider world, including China (a crucial power broker in this area) has been overwhelmingly hostile to North Koreas recent nuclear tests. Unlike in previous years, where the implied threat of testing was enough to form deals which in part benefited North Korea, this test has instead seen the imposition of sanctions and global condemnation. While the regime itself is not under threat, it is clear that the testing of a nuclear weapon has backfired significantly, and led to further isolation.

 

The recent stepping up of rhetoric feels as much about trying to save face internally, by ignoring the deeper isolation (and likely suspension of food aid which would have helped alleviate some of the famine reportedly going on), and instead focusing on the threat to the nation. To that end the rhetoric emerging from Pyongyang in recent days has been significantly more hostile, and has culminated in  a so-called ‘declaration of war’.

 

Is War Likely?

Despite the situation, an intentional war does not seem likely. There is no sign of any mobilisation in the North, and reports on the internet from visitors to South Korea say that there is no increase in military presence there either. The question that needs to be asked is not ‘what does North Korea gain from war’, but ‘what does Kim and his closest advisors gain from war’. Given the near certainty that any North Korean attack would be halted and then eventual regime collapse would surely follow, it is hard to see why Kim would wish to purposefully attack the south as such a move would be akin to ending his own regime.

 

If ones assumes that there is no desire for war in Pyongyang, then the assumption must be that what we are seeing is instead a very public manifestation of Kims attempts to secure the loyalty of the people and secure his own regime. One cannot help but wonder whether he and his advisors are looking for some kind of small victory which allows them to portray to the world (or more accurately North Korea) that he has triumphed over the South and the USA, and enable him to rule with greater support. So, the short answer is no, intentional war is not likely, but the real danger perhaps lies in miscalculation.

 

The authors own very personal concern about this situation is not of a juggernaut Korean army heading south into the DMZ in the manner of a Larry Bond novel. Instead it is where something occurs at a very localised level which rapidly escalates out of control. We’ve seen in the past circumstances where the two sides can exchange fire; given the delegation of authority to unit level to return fire, there is a danger that a poorly aimed live fire exercise, or a genuine miscalculation could lead to a rapid escalation of events over which neither side has full control.

Kim and the Generals - an unlikely pairing? (copyright telegraph.co.uk)

It is highly unlikely to think that the North Korean units would open fire of their own accord. With a very centralized command and control structure, it is unlikely that the regime would be willing to chance an overly keen junior officer starting a war on his own initiative. So, one question of key concern then is what are North Korean rules of engagement? If the situation emerges that they can return fire without further authority, then they could potentially misconstrue live firing exercises near the DMZ and in turn cause an escalation. The worry is perhaps that Kim and his advisors in Pyongyang may find themselves struggling to co-ordinate events, as poor North Korean communications and overtly heavy chains of command struggle to pass the messages in time. By the time the situation is clear, it may be too late to authorise a ‘ceasefire’ order. That then is perhaps the authors greatest worry, that something very minor escalates out of control due to poor understanding on both sides.

 

What would the implications of war be?

As odd a question as this may sound, there are several very serious implications if events in the Korean Penisula were to turn violent. Beyond the likely carnage and vast loss of life that would stem from any attacks, particularly with Seoul being in artillery range of the DMZ, the wider implications would have a huge impact, not just on Korea but also the global economy.

 

Assuming that any war is relatively short, due to the lack of resources, up to date equipment and effective personnel in the North Korean military (think Iraqi military of 1991 with even more obsolete equipment), the South will find itself laden with two major problems. Firstly the cost of rebuilding Seoul and other cities damaged in the attack. This by itself would have major economic consequences for the country and would probably have wider ramifications for the global economy as the worlds 15^th largest economy struggled to rebuild. It could be done, but it would be at a vast cost of resources.

 

The more serious question is ‘what do you do with North Korea itself’? The cost of reunifying Germany in 1991 came in at billions of Marks for the German economy. This was to merge two economies that were not that dissimilar and were both relatively industrialised. To merge the two Korean economies would cost billions, if not trillions, as the South finds itself laden with the requirement to modernise and update a nation with creaking infrastructure not updated in decades. As the population adapted to life in the 21^st century, there is likely to be real challenges preventing movement for jobs, food and support. The sheer scale of the challenge in ‘deprogramming’ the millions of North Koreans who will discover that everything they have taken from granted since birth is a lie is a job which will keep psychologists busy for generations.

 

The serious question probably needs to be asked – could the South ever realistically absorb the

financial and human cost of reunification with North Korea? As we move ever further away from the

last time the peninsula was united, the two countries ties grow fewer. Families split for generations

will eventually lose contact, and the relationship becomes more theoretical than real. As the two

countries have such different experiences, they are effectively becoming two distinct and separate nations. It is hard to imagine that in 30-40 years time as the last few who remember Korea as a united peninsula pass on, that there will be the same desire to work together. Over time one must wonder whether South Korea will eventually seek to step away from reunification and the ever more expensive responsibilities that go with it, in favour of seeing the North as a separate country. While this may be unlikely now, with little real hope for improvement in the economy or life in the North, it will only get more expensive and challenging to resolve this problem.

Contemplating the reality of  and limitations to power? (copyright www.telegraph.co.uk)

 

The Nuclear Question

One issue that the author has deliberately not really focused on is the nuclear issue itself. This is because it is hard to imagine a scenario at present where the North is able to threaten with a nuclear weapon. While they may possess some devices that have been tested, we have not seen evidence of a credible deterrent force, nor an ability to deliver these weapons at any distance. At best a North Korean aircraft may be able to deploy the weapon over the south, assuming it made the run unmolested. Paradoxically, now that North Korea has nuclear weapons, it is discovering that possession is perhaps less valuable than the threat of acquisition. It has already seen that testing weapons does not elicit the same response as shutting down processing and enrichment plants. From a military perspective, until such point as North Korea can field a militarily viable deterrent force, capable of presenting a second strike capability, its nuclear devices are a concern, but hard to see as a useful military tool. Kim is doubtless well aware that use of a nuclear weapon on the peninsula will draw a harsh response from China and Russia, both of whom share land borders with North Korea, let alone the reaction from the USA.

 

So, while it is concerning to wonder what a dictator with nuclear weapons could do if he was so minded, the Koreans currently find themselves in a strange position- not able to command the same attention for possession as acquisition, and not able to make proper military use of any device, their nuclear capability is perhaps far less useful to them than some may think. It is perhaps for this reason then that the North has announced it will reactivate the Yongbyon complex, realising that it can elicit far more concessions from halting a programme in its tracks than it can from demonstrating an existing capability to the outside world.

 

What does this mean for the UK and USA?

There are wider implications of this for both the UK and the USA. For the Americans the current situation, and associated surge in deployment of some highly advanced capabilities will come as an expensive bill during this time of sequestration. The funding for the deployment of F22s and B2s will be found, but one has to wonder what else will be cut to pay for it. Given the deep financial crisis that the Pentagon currently finds itself in, this crisis is an unhelpful reminder that the outside world is not beholden to congressional politics. It also serves as a reminder that despite the focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, the US still has a large and very capable force deployed in both Japan and Korea to focus on the threat from the North.

 

For the UK the crisis has once again highlighted the value of both the Defence Attaché network and the wider Embassy network. While Humphrey has no idea at all of the sort of communications that have gone on, it is worth noting that the UK has an embassy in Pyongyang, unlike the US or most other Western governments. This means that even on a low key level, the UK is able to meet with North Korean counterparts and actually talk to them in some way – which is more than most other countries are able to do. This is arguably of genuine value to our allies as it enables us to offer a genuinely credible perspective on how things are going in Pyongyang and how they interpret the world. For a very small outlay to run the Embassy, the UK is able to help maintain influence in the ‘credit bank’ which we can use when justifying our value to other nations such as the US.

 

Similarly the presence of a senior Defence Attaché in Seoul helps serve as a reminder that the UK still has defence commitments to the region, and is a member of the UN Armistice Commission that was created at the end of the Korean war. The presence of this official allows the UK the opportunity to see the developing crisis from both sides, and to have a much better understanding of what is going on in the region.

 

For those who say that this doesn’t matter, then they should consider this - namely that any war which damages the South Korean and wider Asian economy will also have a massively damaging impact on our own economy. The global economy is so interlinked now that the fallout from the conflict could see major job losses and economic difficulty in the UK, plus the wider ramifications of human tragedy that inevitably follows a conflict. By following this properly, understanding the situation and being able to hopefully influence in a very small way, the UK is able to try and ensure it is best placed to understand and help resolve the situation. As a member of the P5, and a nation with strong economic and cultural interests in the region, the UK does have a strong vested interest in the peaceful resolution to this current situation.

 

Conclusions 

This is a difficult time for the Korean Peninsula, it is always concerning when rhetoric is notched up

and talk of war follows, no matter where the situation is. One must hope that cooler heads prevail

and that the circumstances emerge whereby the North is able to stand down with its dignity

relatively intact, so as to avoid humiliating a potentially dangerous foe. One must hope that this

situation resolves itself peacefully, for the consequences if things do go wrong are simply too terrible to contemplate.